

Time of shyness and silence

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What for societies is a fact of experience, what for certain societies and/or religions, even the most diverse, gave room for initiation rituals, from Freud onwards the puberty is defined as the culmination of infantile sexuality, perverse-polymorphous. This definition doesn't disqualify rituals but, beyond the anthropological importance they represent, offers them the support of a space as common as inevitable.

"The finding of an object is in fact the refinding of it," he says in the third of his *"Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality"*: *"The transformations of puberty"*. The object, repressed, in Oedipus declension, reappears in the pubertal period. And infantile sexuality, early object oriented, refinds the object from a body biologically disposed to the exercise of sexuality. A body pierced by hormones (the "chemical theory" to which Freud, in his days, referred to; "the pubertal glands" as he after called them), a body at the expense of a driving activity that requires of the pubescent, the maximum amount of resources to face it. A body that will have to bear a new repression wave while drives require once again the course of their destinies, a body exposed to the fact that the achieved repression or some possible sublimation doesn't stabilize any imbalance that is installed and let the subject confronted with a work demand from which he may be not able to account without being significantly affected. Times of full masturbatory satisfaction, orgasmic, that finds in the Oedipal structure (supposedly) -closed since the beginning of the latency- the path of guilt, evident or not. They are times of shyness or shamelessness, times of silence or untimely exclamations able to darken any discursive mode. It's a time of oddities, of exacerbated parental fears, of concern of psychoanalysts who recommend if not the systematic analysis of pubescents (there are Kleinian backgrounds on the prophylactic analysis of children as resource against -for this doctrine- a possible infantile psychosis), at least the prophylactic continuity of (some) analysis started during latency, while psychosis would be always lurking, always waiting for a bad balanced driving imbalance. If latency didn't installed favored by the

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play, if the subjective silence, product of the inhibition or of some poverty (subjective) already installed, abandons the subject to the death drive domains, if repression, we repeat, didn't properly installed its circuits, puberty will mark the passage through an experience that, in Lacanian terms, will say about the failed of the Name of the Father and *will focus the expectations of standardization* on the Ego ideal in the Own Name or in some other substitution that cover the function of the failed. Puberty confronts us with a fundamental fact: the subject's experience in assembling his *fantasy* (in Freudian terms), *unconscious fantasy* (in Kleinian terms), or the *phantom* (in Lacanian terms). *The phantasmatic mounting has everything going for it to cover that space of an extreme body resonance constructed by the structure.*

And here, as regards to this mounting, the enigmatic lines with which Freud closes the chapter 6 of "*The Unconscious*" resound to us: "the split between preconscious and unconscious systems are established only at puberty."

And we say "enigmatic", although we understand what it says, because Freud never stopped himself to unfold this idea. We can *suppose* that he adds to the refinding of the object at a later logical moment, *a structure prepared not only for genital realizing, but also for analysis*. For Freud this *clear distinction* is needed for an analysis to be possible. (The differences with Klein are notable). The problem -and it's not the only one- is that this differentiation preconscious-unconscious doesn't reach for the pubescent to find facilitated the way for the analysis. There's something in that Freudian paragraph that's only compatible with a theoretical rigor that is detached from practice. We know that for Freud this difference is necessary but not a sufficient condition for the analytic device to find its place, considering it's a question of locating the *symptom* that motorizes the subject towards the analysis in a space (which corresponds to the Lacanian graph of desire), that the ego installs between he and the Ideal, necessary articulation for the demand to be constituted. Until this joint *doesn't constitute itself*, the analysis will be always complicated. And that is the space in which children, pubescent and psychotic, stagger. Let's add in relation to *what's complicated*: more than what turns out *even* when the device *is* articulated.

From the demand and the symptom, the transference finds its place. And here we stumble with a typical question of pubescents (also of children) in their relationship with the analyst: the presence of the parents. This presence makes the transference to be a more complex area than that borne by a neurotic adult.

(This experience is available to all those who are treating children, pubescents or adolescents).

For Freud this presence hasn't been a minor thing: in the last conferences of 1916, he argues that those persons who weren't *sui juris* shouldn't be accepted in analysis. I.e. they should be legally responsible for themselves. That is, he adds, from the legal point of view, a difficulty to a field that already has difficulties in itself. Although Dora and the homosexual young woman weren't pubescents but adolescents, the presence of the father in each one of them determined the course of the analysis. In the case of Dora, the father matching up his desire towards Mrs. K with Freud's desire: to emphasize the girl's hysterical position; in the homosexual young woman case, the father asking Freud to undo the girl's desire by the *cocotte* and to introduce her into the sexuality determined by social rules, and that were too heavy for him. (Freud gives account of these difficulties, respectively, in the Epilogue of Dora and in the item I of the homosexual young woman).

Then we have on the one hand a structural disposition that would enable the pubescent's path into an analysis: the differentiation of preconscious/unconscious systems; on the other hand a complex transference given by the parents' presence; if we add the silence of the pubescent as "*repressive*" reinforcement facing the emergence of blaming fantasies (most of the time), we found a scene that surrounds the pubescent in a unique climate: unlike the child he's in a position to talk although he's usually silent and, unlike the neurotic adult tormented by his symptom, usually he *needs* a silence that protect him from any shock that the word may produce in him. (The phantom's *confession* usually marks the final moments in the analysis of an adolescent). *To place the language in the middle of an analysis is a view that covers the entire field of speaker beings. Except that the statement/enunciation difference can be so devalued that the subject could be consolidated in a realization with no extenuating circumstances, unwanted variation of a sustained silence or of a speech that says nothing.* Putting it in another way: the unconscious as such could be not able to be heard by the ears of who should be in charge of the discourse: the analysand...

Let's add, to the Freudian phrase regarding the full establishment of the preconscious/unconscious difference as a *pubertal* heritage, the registration of the difference of sexes on a level where we can find both sexes prepared for putting sexuality into practice. (Cf "Spring Awakening" the play of Frank Wedekind, in which we see, in teens' mouth, just a little beyond of what is often called puberty, the parade of

concerns, fantasies and actions articulable with sex and death that seem the staging of some pubertal code *that crosses the uniqueness* of each personage).

Leaving aside the presence of the parents -and to whom it may concern to hide such heresy he may look the other way- we will locate ourselves in front of the pubescent. It's very true that, unlike the child (we have said it already), he uses a language in which the reality makes sense, but in which also there is a cut of the subjective field in which the phantom crosses the boundary between the inside and the outside. From the topology of the cross cup, Lacan will say that "The reality is constituted by the phantom".

The silence, the confusion as effect of the drivings that cover (un)known marks in a changing body, the enjoyment of a sexuality blamed by the unconscious support it receives from the infantile sexuality, the inevitable paranoia that answers to the silent gaze of the analyst, the reserve caused by the attempt to shorten distances that the analyst is tempted to offer, the almost systematic rejection that the pubescent offers to what the analyst might propose him as happening into another scene... This is the most common condition that the pubescent gives to psychoanalysis. Of course there are those who say to have analyzed a pubescent and they have valid reasons to say it; of course, there are those who say they have helped a pubescent to overcome some inhibitions. Of course, the intervention of an analyst in the pubescent's life, who supports sufferings that limit him in excess, both in the productive of his life and in his social or family model, might be beneficial...

But let's point to something else: let's point to put *under the label of difficulty* the knowledge about the pubescent that disguise a facilitation of analysis. And we extend it: as all knowledge that it is constituted around a moment in the life taken in its chronology, from which lines emanate that are easily identified as that which is interpretable ... for every pubescent. Of course, we enter in a field in which the pubescent can't express himself.

We remember the Klein's attempt to introduce herself into the analysis of children (she does it in 1919) from considering that the infantile symptoms are supported by a poor information about the questions that child's sexuality generate in the child, and makes of the analysis the place of the *correct informations, ignoring that the infantile sexuality culminates in failure*. In this operation, the "for every child" doesn't leave the uniqueness of sufferings aside?

We say: whenever a situation of development is identified as corresponding to certain constants, the analyst will be tempted to resort to them, taking for granted that it can't be anything else other than that.

That leads to the fact that the difficulties posed by the pubescent to the analyst are processed by the knowing that the analyst has about "those who are pubescent", a group whose homogeneity facilitates the elision of singularity. As noted, this, that in children could and can happen with other arguments, in the neurotic adult doesn't happen: there isn't other way out but to analyze it in the uniqueness of his speech. It may be replaced, *that that doesn't happen* by the *application* of the theory that's available for the analyst: to analyze, or rather, to *seem* that he analyzes; it's a symptom of psychoanalysis.

Which doesn't mean that these interventions haven't, in pubescence, we repeat it, some efficacy.

We refer, for example, to that gaze that focuses on mourning, that of the infantile body or that of the childhood's parents; to the ambivalence between the dependence and the independence from the parents, to the fear of change, to the fearful surprise of the discovery of body modification...

It's according to these appreciations that it seems pertinent to ask for the "benefit" that means to an analysis the fact that the analysand should be going through a *moment of life* in which one can know, without the need of listening, the conflicts that cross him.

Let's say something more: one gives in to these temptations when, at some point, the analyst's disorientation is marked. This is what happened to the child analysis: from the moment in which it's found that the play of the child -leaving aside the Kleinian interpretation- is little or not understood, the attempt to locate the play related to the stages of development arises, such that these must be the guides that the analyst will use in his interpretation.

Based on this, we say that all previous knowledge, put into action, is a guaranteed answer with which the analyst can conceal the difficulty that may put him closer to the feeling of helplessness. Of course this doesn't happen only with pubescents: is a constant in psychoanalysis. We make the exception when it's the knowledge of a

chronological (and not logical) moment of the development which, he thinks, to locate the analyst.

If we say that prior knowledge is an obstacle, to what should we resort for an analysis *during* puberty could be possible as such? Of course, said like that, it's a manoeuvre unloaded onto the analyst. The imaginary transference has its effects and favors certain modifications. The point is not to confuse the plans, the imaginary and the symbolic, not only at the time of the meeting of the pubescent with the analyst, but also in the transmission effects that each analyst might generate.

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